Should religion enjoy special protections in american society? Five arguments and a speculation by McClay, Wilfred M.
Wilfred M. McClay
SHOULD RELIGION ENJOY SPECIAL PROTECTIONS 
IN AMERICAN SOCIETY? FIVE ARGUMENTS 
AND A SPECULATION
The belief in religious freedom used to be one of the unquestioned universals in 
American culture. But it has lately emerged as one of the fiercest points of conten-
tion in the American culture wars. Indeed, during the whole of 2012, the Obama 
Administration was subjected to strenuous criticism for its perceived hostility, or 
at best cavalier indifference, to the cause of religious freedom in the United States. 
First, there was the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision against the Administra-
tion’s position in the Hosanna-Tabor case, in which it had sought to deny the ap-
plicability of a “ministerial exemption” to the staffing of church-run schools. Then, 
more famously, came the case of the Department of Health and Human Services 
mandate that would require all employers, including church-run schools, hospitals, 
and charities, to provide their employees with health-insurance plans covering con-
traceptives, abortifacients, and sterilization procedures – a requirement that would 
necessitate, particularly for the Roman Catholic Church, the violation of some of 
its core moral teachings.
The opposition to these actions was swift and unequivocal. It produced an 
unprecedented degree of unity among the often fractious American Catholic bi-
shops, and quickly brought into being a remarkably ecumenical coalition, embra-
cing a broad array of evangelical Protestant leaders, such as the president of Whe-
aton College, arguably the most eminent evangelical college in the country, as well 
as eminent figures from across the full spectrum of American religious communi-
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ties: Jews, Muslims, Mormons, Sikhs, and so on. Everywhere the rallying cry was 
directed, not to the support of specific Catholic doctrines, but to the general defense 
of religious freedom. 
Secular supporters of the Obama Administration have been equally vehement 
in their disagreement, and have seemed both annoyed and mystified by the protests. 
How, wondered Ed Kilgore, writing in the March 2012 Washington Monthly, did 
“religious freedom” ever come to mean “the right to have one’s particular religious 
views explicitly reflected in public policy”? What gives Catholic bishops the right 
to “contend they should be able to operate a wide range of quasi-public services 
and also enjoy the use of public subsidies, while refusing to comply with laws and 
regulations that contradict their religious or moral teachings”? Were they not in fact 
seeking “a sort of unwritten concordat – a broad zone of immunity from laws they 
choose to regard as offensive”? Were they not seeking “special privileges”?
These are important questions which require a thoughtful and respectful re-
sponse. Indeed, they go to the heart of the culture war that still rages in American 
life. Religious believers in America need to prepare themselves to hear such qu-
estions asked again and again in the years to come, and contemplate how they 
will answer them. For beneath the controversy about religious freedom is a deeper 
controversy, about the nature and status of religion itself in the American legal and 
political order. 
That controversy is nothing new, of course. It runs through much of Ame-
rican history, taking on different guises and embracing different antagonists and 
issues at different times. But it has achieved a unique importance and potency at 
this historical moment, when the American legal and political world is more intent 
than ever upon upholding the principle of neutrality in all things. What is so spe-
cial about religion, then, that it should receive any such “special privileges”? Why 
should Americans treat a church or other religious association differently than they 
treat any other social club or cultural organization, or treat the rights of a religious 
adherent any differently than they would treat the expressive liberties of any other 
individual? 
Such questions have largely ceased to be asked in Western Europe. But the 
drive to ask them is a fairly recent development in American history, and perhaps 
a sign of the growing secularity of so much of its public life. But there is no denying 
the fact that, in some sense, religion and religious institutions are not treated accor-
ding to a principle of strict neutrality in the United States. To be sure, the recognition 
and support of “religion” is something dramatically different from the establishment 
of a particular religion, a distinction that the First Amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution sought to codify. The fact remains, though, that something like a generic 
monotheism enjoys a privileged public status in present-day America, even though 
religious believers often fail to notice it, or complain that it is being steadily eroded. 
Examples abound. One still sees the name of God on the American currency, 
in the Pledge of Allegiance, in the oaths taken in court, in the concluding words of 
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presidential speeches, and even, it seems, popping up in** the platforms of both 
major political parties. Chaplains are still employed by the armed services and the 
Congress, and the latter still duly commences its sessions with the invocation of 
a prayer. The tax exemption of religious institutions remains intact and seemingly 
impregnable, at least for the moment. The most solemn observances, such as the 
National Day of Prayer and Remembrance in the wake of 9/11, are held in the 
Washington National Cathedral, and are conducted in a manner that draws heavily 
on the liturgical and musical heritage of Western Christianity. One could compose 
a long list of similar examples. The United States is a long way from being of-
ficially secular, even if it may be tending in that direction. And however much 
Americans accept, or claim to accept, a principle of church-state separation, a better 
description of the way they actually have conducted themselves would be selective 
interpenetration.  
***
Secular critics worry whether privileging religion in any way flies in the face of the 
principle of separation, and represents an illegitimate coercion of conscience. Some 
religious believers see merit in these contentions, particularly the second one, in 
a country where the freedom of the individual is so often taken to be the very sum 
and essence of religious freedom. Georgetown professor Jacques Berlinerblau’s 
lively and valuable new book How to Be Secular is subtitled A Call to Arms for Re-
ligious Freedom, reflecting a freewheeling understanding of religious freedom that 
is as jealously protective of atheism and “freedom from” religion as it is of belief.1 
In addition, there are respectable religious arguments against religion’s being 
granted a privileged status. Some of them are reminiscent of the views of Roger 
Williams, the great American dissenter, and recall one of the central arguments 
against any establishment of religion: that installation of a state religion inevitably 
leads, in the long run, to perfunctoriness, placeseeking, faithlessness, coercion, co-
optation, atrophy, and spiritual death. In other words, the establishment of religion 
is bad for religion. When one looks at the sad and irrelevant state of the empty es-
tablished churches of Europe today, one sees the power of the argument. The bride 
of Christ has all too often ended up a kept woman. 
By contrast, as Alexis de Tocqueville was able to see as early as the 1830s, 
the American style of religious freedom, far from diminishing the hold of religion, 
kept it vital and energetic, precisely by making it voluntary. Indeed, many Chri-
stians, particularly those drawing on the Anabaptist tradition, would contend that 
when churches are cut loose from entanglement in the polity and its civil religion, 
committed only to being a people set apart, they are freed to be more radical, more 
sacrificial, and more faithful, a living sign of contradiction – in short, more genu-
inely Christian. 
1 J. Berlinerblau, How to Be Secular: A Call to Arms for Religious Freedom, New York 2012.
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But the example of the HHS mandate shows the limits of this approach, 
when one is dealing with an act of comprehensive public policy that is designed to 
be universal in character. One does not have the option of declaring one’s indepen-
dence from such an all-embracing policy, or opting out of it, for there is nowhere to 
go and no place to hide. Hence the significance of Kilgore’s mischaracterization of 
the Catholic bishops, who in fact are not seeking to use public policy to bar Ameri-
cans from using and paying for contraceptives, or even to bar Catholics from using 
them, but instead are opposing the use of government’s coercive power to compel 
Catholic organizations to pay for their use. Making even such a seemingly small 
accommodation to the long-settled and fundamental religious identity of the Ca-
tholic Church – an organization that, ironically, has a long and consistent record in 
support of the policy of universal health care – was apparently deemed impermissi-
ble. The American bishops therefore were not the ones insisting that their religious 
views should dominate public policy. 
They are, however, insisting upon being dealt with separately, with respect 
shown for their particular commitments. They are doing so in a way that presumes 
religious freedom means not merely do-what-you-want neutrality, but a kind of de-
ference paid to religion per se. And that is precisely the point here at issue. What’s 
so special about religion, that it should be granted such deferential attention? Can 
arguments for that proposition be adduced that will be compelling, or at least plau-
sible, not only to those who need no persuasion, but to those who do? 
***
Let me offer five such arguments in what follows. These surely do not exhaust all 
the possibilities, but begin to suggest some of the reasons why the discussion about 
religious freedom needs to be placed in a larger and richer context than the sterile 
logic of abstract neutrality can allow. 
First there is what I will call the foundational argument, which points back 
to our historical roots, and to the animating spirit of the American Founders and 
the Constitutional order that they devised and instituted. The Founders had diverse 
views about a variety of matters, very much including their own personal religious 
convictions, but they were in complete and emphatic agreement about one thing: 
the inescapable importance of religion, and of the active encouragement of religio-
us belief, for the success of the American experiment. Examples of this view are 
plentiful. John Adams insisted that “Man is constitutionally, essentially and un-
changeably a religious animal. Neither philosophers or politicians can ever govern 
him any other way.” And the universally respected George Washington was a parti-
cularly eloquent exponent of the view that religion was essential to the maintenan-
ce of public morality, without which a republican government could not survive. 
The familiar words of his Farewell Address in 1796 – “of all the dispositions and 
habits which lead to political prosperity, Religion and morality are indispensable 
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supports” – can be made to stand in for countless others, from John Adams, Ben-
jamin Rush, John Jay, and so on, as an indicative example. That this high regard 
extended to religious institutions as well as individual religious beliefs is made 
clear by Washington’s remark, in 1789, that “If I could have entertained the sligh-
test apprehension that the Constitution framed in the Convention, where I had the 
honor to preside, might possibly endanger the religious rights of any ecclesiastical 
Society, certainly I would never have placed my signature to it.” If we are looking 
for a plausible grounding for our deference paid to religion, we can begin with the 
testimony of the Founders of the American constitutional order itself. 
Very well, you may respond, but that was then and this is now. Why sho-
uld present-day Americans feel bound by the Founders’ beliefs or their eighteenth-
-century mentalities? None of the Founders could possibly have envisioned the 
cultural and religious diversity of America in the 21st century. Their vision assumed 
a degree of cultural uniformity that would be beyond the present’s power to restore, 
even if it wanted to. 
True enough. But the very fact of that diversity itself leads to a second argu-
ment for deference to religion, a pluralistic argument which would seek to protect 
religion all the more zealously as a source of moral order and social cohesion. 
There is a reason why accounts of the history of American immigration and 
of the history of American religion so often end up relating the very same history. 
From the mid-nineteenth century on, every new wave of immigration to America 
brought peoples for whom a set of distinctive religious beliefs and practices formed 
the core of their identity. Some of the worst examples of religious prejudice in 
American history come out of the cultural clashes and anxieties of these years; but 
so too did the idea of pluralism as a central feature of American life. As Richard 
John Neuhaus and Peter Berger came to formulate it, “This nation is constituted as 
an exercise in pluralism, as the unum within which myriad plures are sustained.” 
The persistence of regional, religious, ethnic, and other differences, so long as they 
are not invidious in character or dependent upon unjust or illegal segregation or 
restriction, is something to be desired, because it means that the moral communi-
ties within which consciences are formed – churches, synagogues, mosques, and 
the like – remain healthy. Hence in America, as Neuhaus and Berger understood it, 
the national purpose rightly understood ought to seek, not to undermine particular 
affinities or purposes, but to strengthen them.2
Hence it is essential that religious freedom be understood not only as an indi-
vidual liberty but also as a corporate liberty, a liberty that applies to and inheres in 
groups, and defends the integrity and self-governance of such groups. How could it 
be otherwise, since a religion, like a language, is an inherently social thing, quintes-
sentially an activity of groups rather than the property of isolated individuals? Reli-
gious freedom must be understood in this dual aspect, protecting not only the liber-
2 P. L. Berger, R. J. Neuhaus, To Empower People: From State to Civil Society, Washington 
1996, pp. 202–208.
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ty of individuals, but also the liberty of churches and other religious institutions and 
communities: protecting their freedom to define what they are and what they are 
not, to control the meaning and terms of their membership, to freely exercise their 
faith by the way they choose to raise their children and order their community life, 
seeking to embody their religion’s moral self-understanding in lived experience. 
There are, of course, limits to this autonomy, as there must be to all liberties 
and all forms of pluralism. Religious liberty is not a carte blanche, or an all-purpo-
se get-out-of-jail-card, and its limits cannot be established once and for all by the 
invocation of some pristine abstract principle. But its essential place in the healthy 
life of the plures should ensure for it a high degree of respect, and set the bar very 
high for any government action that would have the effect of burdening religion’s 
free exercise. That respect and that high bar have generally been affirmed by the 
Federal courts and the Congress. 
A third argument for religion’s special place might be called an anthropolo-
gical one. Human beings are theotropic by their nature, inclined toward religion, 
and driven to relate their understanding of the highest things to their lives as lived in 
the community together, both metaphysically and morally. Whether this characteri-
stic can be attributed to in-built endowment, evolutionary adaptation, or some other 
source, it would seem to be a good thing for the secular order to affirm our theotro-
pic impulses rather than seek to proscribe them or inhibit their expression. Inde-
ed, the vote of public confidence implied by such affirmation naturally engenders 
a sense of general loyalty to the polity, and binds religious believers affectionately 
to the secular political project far more effectively than would an insistence upon 
a rigorously secularist public square. Indeed, the latter course would present the 
very real danger of producing alienated subcultures of religious believers whose 
sectarian disaffection with the mainstream could become so profound as to repre-
sent a threat to the very cohesion of the nation. Secularists who worry about reli-
gion’s taking an outsized role in public life would be better advised to give some 
strategic ground on that issue, and acknowledge the theotropic dimension in our 
makeup, even if they believe it to be a weakness or debility.
Such acknowledgement has the added benefit of promoting the development 
of a healthy civil religion, which is nothing more than an expression of our incor-
rigible need to relate secular things to ultimate purposes. Civil religion promotes 
political and social cohesion, while serving as a visible embodiment, of sorts, of the 
generalized thing we call “religion.” But there are better and worse ways of doing 
this. Civil religion can, of course, be extremely dangerous, a form of playing with 
fire, and is viewed with understandable suspicion from all quarters. It borrows from 
the energy of specific faiths, but always carries with it the danger of usurping and 
displacing them, and underwriting a pernicious idolatry of the state or the nation. 
Hence it needs to be kept on a short leash. 
But properly understood, the American civil religion also draws upon sour-
ces of moral authority that transcend the state, and are capable of holding the state 
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accountable to a standard higher than itself. A civil religion can be, as Yale sociolo-
gist Philip Gorski recently argued, “a mediating tradition that allows room for both 
religious and political values.” And the more that the activity of specific religions is 
accorded respect in the public sphere, the less likely it is that a civil religion will be 
successful in displacing them. 
A fourth argument might be called the meliorist argument, which would ack-
nowledge religion’s special place in American life because of the extensive social 
good that religious institutions have done, and continue to do, in the world; and 
because the doing of such good works is an essential part of the free exercise of 
religion. This argument follows in the footsteps of the Founders’ emphasis on moral 
formation of citizens, and also embraces the role of religious groups in abolishing 
slavery, promoting civil rights, running orphanages, caring for the indigent, and 
the like. But has taken on a weight of its own today, given the vast scale and scope 
of charitable, medical, and educational activities still undertaken by religious gro-
ups today. Let the Catholic church stand as a powerful example of this. The HHS 
mandate is so consequential because the Catholic church is so heavily involved in 
precisely these three areas, as the operator of nearly 7,500 primary and secondary 
schools, enrolling 2.5 million students, and some 600 hospitals (comprising nearly 
13% of American hospitals and 15% of hospital beds), 400 health centers, and 
1,500 specialized homes, making it the operator of the largest private educational 
and health-care systems in the country. In addition, Catholic Charities USA is, as of 
2011, the seventh-largest charity in the nation (the second largest being the religio-
usly oriented Salvation Army). 
And, looking at the matter of religion’s life-improving qualities from another 
angle, one can point to a growing body of social-scientific evidence, appearing in 
the work of writers as diverse as Byron Johnson, Arthur Brooks, Jonathan Haidt, 
and Robert Putnam, indicating that religious belief correlates very reliably with the 
fostering of generosity, law-abidingness, helpfulness to others, civic engagement, 
social trust, and many other traits that are essential to a peaceful, productive, and 
harmonious society. One must, of course, stipulate that there will always be hypo-
crites, charlatans, fakes and abusers in religious organizations, as in all walks of 
life. But it would appear that, far from religion being a poison, as the late Christo-
pher Hitchens liked to argue, it has, at least in America, been an antidote. It seems 
counterproductive to downplay its many benefits.
Last but not least, there is an argument that I will call metaphysical. It is often 
said that religious freedom is the first freedom, since it is grounded in the dignity 
and integrity of the human person, which requires that each of us be permitted to 
fulfill our right, and duty, to seek and embrace the truth about our existence, and 
live out our lives in accordance with our understanding of that truth. This is, or sho-
uld be, a universal freedom, because the great questions of human existence are not 
the exclusive province of professors and savants, but belong to us all. Any good so-
ciety, committed to the flourishing of its members, should recognize and encourage 
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and support that search. To acknowledge that fact in a public way, with an explicit 
recognition of the valuable place of religion, is an important declaration about the 
value a society places on the spiritual and moral life of its members. 
But there is far more to the metaphysical argument than that. Indeed, there is 
a growing recognition that, in a postmodern world dominated by immense bureau-
cratic governments and sprawling transnational business corporations (entities that 
increasingly seem to operate in tandem – behemoths that are neither responsive to 
the tools of democratic governance nor accountable to national law nor answerable 
to any well-established code of behavior), religion serves as an indispensable coun-
terweight. It is an essential resource for the upholding of human dignity and moral 
order, for speaking truth to power, for giving support to the concept of human rights, 
and for insisting that a voice of moral urgency – whether celebrating, exhorting, or 
rebuking – never becomes banished from the cold logic of instrumental rationality. 
It has played this role before in history, and done so heroically. Evangelical 
religious conviction provided the animating force behind what was arguably the 
greatest reform movement in American history, the nineteenth-century movement 
to abolish slavery. The moral leadership of Pope John Paul II played a key role in 
bringing about the end of Soviet tyranny in Eastern Europe. Such countervailing 
force will almost certainly be required of it again. As the sociologist Jose Casano-
va eloquently argued in his 1994 book Public Religions in the Modern World, the 
modern world runs the risk of being “devoured by the inflexible, inhuman logic of 
its own creations,” unless it restores a “creative dialogue” with the very religious 
traditions it has eviscerated or abandoned. That dialogue will not be fruitful unless 
we sustain and protect the special public standing that religion has hitherto enjoyed. 
***
And now, having given my five arguments, let me offer my final speculation. For 
there is an even deeper question here, the question of whether our concept of fre-
edom itself, and more generally the liberal individualism we have come to embrace 
in the modern West, is sustainable in the absence of the Judeo-Christian religious 
assumptions that have hitherto accompanied and upheld it. There are a number of 
thoughtful atheist writers who, perhaps surprisingly, see great merit in this idea. 
The Italian writer Marcello Pera, for example, has argued that it is a dangerous 
illusion to believe that such ideas as the dignity of the human person can be susta-
ined for long without some ultimate grounding in the deep normative orientation of 
the Christian faith. Ironically, the very possibility of a “secular” realm of politics, 
which we embrace in the West as a good thing (and which is the necessary basis 
for any robust understanding of religious freedom), may depend upon the presence 
of certain specifically Christian distinctives, embodied in culture as much as in 
doctrine.3
3 M. Pera, Why We Should Call Ourselves Christians: The Religious Roots of Free Societies, 
trans. L. B. Lappin, New York 2008.
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This is an assertion that thoughtful secularists ought to find at least plau-
sible. Indeed, Pera’s concerns had been precisely anticipated by one of the most 
religiously heterodox figures of early American history, Thomas Jefferson. On one 
of the panels decorating the walls of the Jefferson Memorial in Washington appear 
these searing words: “God who gave us life gave us liberty. Can the liberties of 
a nation be secure when we have removed a conviction that these liberties are the 
gift of God? Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just, that His 
justice cannot sleep forever.” 
Jefferson was speaking in that passage of the moral scourge of slavery, and 
asking, rhetorically, whether there could be any moral justification for the failure to 
extend the blessings of liberty to all men. But there is a larger implicit point. Jeffer-
son was saying that the very possibility of human liberty itself, the liberty of every 
man and woman, was dependent upon our prior willingness to understand liberty 
as a gift of God, rather than a dispensation of man. The name of God serves as far 
more than a mere rhetorical device in this context. Even a world-class skeptic like 
Jefferson understood that erasing the name of God from the foundations of Ame-
rican public life could lead to fearful consequences. Which provides yet another 
reason why defending the special status of religion in American life is not merely 
a reasonable and defensible path, but one of fundamental importance.
Czy religia powinna cieszyć się szczególną ochroną w społeczeństwie amerykańskim?
Pięć argumentów i hipoteza
Artykuł podejmuje kluczowy dla zrozumienia współczesnych wojen o kulturę temat obecno-
ści religii w przestrzeni publicznej w Stanach Zjednoczonych. Pokazuje niezbędny kulturotwórczy 
charakter doświadczenia religijnego w USA w budowaniu stabilnego porządku politycznego. Autor 
uważa, że publiczna obecność religii jest warunkiem koniecznym do nadania dyspucie na temat celów 
wspólnoty amerykańskiej wymiaru pluralistycznego i obywatelskiego. 
